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ITT NEXUS | INVITED EXPERT PERSPECTIVE | AIM CONGRESS 2026

Man wearing glasses and a suit, smiling.

The Socioeconomic Disintegration Cycle: Investment, Dependency and Societal Capacity Under Repeated

 Author: Mark Nuttall


Title: 

Senior Board Advisor at  Successo Ventures 


3 September 2026 | 4-minute read 


Article Summary


Mark Nuttall proposes the “Socioeconomic Disintegration Cycle” as a framework for understanding how one disruption can reduce the capacity of an economy or society to withstand the next. 

Examining supply-chain concentration, conflict, infrastructure dependency, household vulnerability, institutional trust, artificial intelligence and quantum security, he argues that headline economic recovery may conceal persistent losses in productive, household, fiscal and institutional capacity. 

The article introduces “locationalisation” as a method for identifying where essential capabilities must remain operational and how they should be supported across local, national, regional and international levels. 


Nuttall presents the framework as a testable proposition requiring comparative evidence rather than as an established conclusion.


ITT Nexus | Editor’s Introduction


Recent shocks have demonstrated that economic resilience depends not only on assets or production within a single organisation or jurisdiction, but on the wider systems required to finance, authorise, deliver and sustain essential activity. 


When successive disruptions weaken businesses, households, infrastructure and institutions, conventional measures of recovery may not reveal the full deterioration in societal capacity.


In this contribution to the ITT Nexus Invited Expert Perspectives Series, published in connection with our official media partnership with AIM Congress 2026, Mark Nuttall, Senior Board Advisor at Successo Ventures, introduces the proposed Socioeconomic Disintegration Cycle. 


His framework connects investment, dependency and repeated shock, offering policymakers, investors and business leaders a structured basis for evaluating resilience across interconnected economic and social systems.

The Socioeconomic Disintegration Cycle: Investment, Dependency and Societal Capacity Under Repeated

Mark Nuttall

3 September 2026 

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The disruptions that began in 2020 exposed the extent to which economic activity depends upon functions outside the company, asset or jurisdiction in which production appears to take place. Covid-19 affected medical supplies, semiconductors, freight, labour mobility, public services and access to markets. Governments and companies reviewed supply chains and increased inventories in selected sectors, but reserved capacity, duplicate contracts and additional stock became visible costs again as commercial conditions normalised. OECD analysis found that trade linked to global value chains still accounted for around 17 per cent of global GDP in 2024, while separate OECD work found significant import concentration around 50 per cent higher in the early 2020s than in the late 1990s (OECD, 2025; OECD, 2026a). This extends my earlier work on supply-chain complexity, threats to globalisation, and the interaction between corruption, geopolitics and security (Nuttall, 2021; 2022a; 2022b).


The 2026 disruption affecting the Strait of Hormuz showed how unresolved dependency can move through an economy. The US Energy Information Administration estimated that crude oil and petroleum liquids transported through Hormuz averaged 4.9 million barrels per day during the second quarter of 2026, compared with 21.6 million barrels per day during the fourth quarter of 2025 (EIA, 2026). Production, shipping, insurance, banking, storage, foreign exchange, working capital, industrial inputs, transport and household expenditure were exposed. The analytical unit is the complete transaction: the functions required to authorise, finance, fulfil, record and settle an activity within the period in which it must continue operating. This draws on transaction-cost economics and global-value-chain governance, where control and capability can sit in different places within the same transaction (Williamson, 1981; Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005).


I use the term Socioeconomic Disintegration Cycle for a proposed process in which disruption leaves an economy or society with less usable capacity to absorb a later disruption. It can begin with war, disease, infrastructure failure, cyberattack, financial disruption, sanctions, political instability, natural hazard, technological displacement, or failure of a strategically important provider. Firms adjust through cash reserves, credit, reduced output, delayed investment, workforce reductions, relocation or closure. Employment and household income change, public expenditure and administrative demand increase, and markets and institutions may weaken during the response. Regional-resilience research has shown that shocks can produce persistent and path-dependent effects rather than uniform recovery (Martin, 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2015).


Households carry a substantial part of this adjustment. Lower income and employment can affect food, housing, health care, schooling, transport, savings, debt and mobility, while displacement separates families from work, schools, health services and support networks. Disease can intensify the same pressures by reducing labour availability and increasing demands on health systems. WHO reporting from the Greater Horn of Africa in 2026 records conflict, displacement, recurrent disease outbreaks, economic pressure, acute food insecurity and fragile health systems operating concurrently (WHO, 2026). The 2026 Global Report on Food Crises records 266 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 47 countries and territories during 2025, with conflict and insecurity remaining the principal driver across much of the affected population (FAO, WFP and GNAFC, 2026).


As household, market and institutional buffers weaken, crime and public-order conditions can also change. UNODC's Global Study on Homicide identifies relationships between inequality, deprivation, weak rule of law and homicide risk, while its 2025 organised-crime analysis describes links among illicit economies, organised criminal groups, violence, conflict, corruption, reduced legitimate investment and weaker growth (UNODC, 2023; UNODC, 2025). Economic experience also affects confidence in institutions. Evidence across 166 countries links stronger lifetime growth experience with higher trust in government, while research covering more than two million respondents across 148 countries finds unemployment consistently associated with lower confidence in national government (Besley, Dann and Dray, 2026; Popova et al., 2026).


Racial, ethnic, religious, theological and political divisions can become relevant when exclusion, discrimination, resource competition, weak institutions and deliberate mobilisation operate together. The United Nations atrocity-risk framework identifies persistent discrimination, unequal access to rights and resources, intergroup tensions, impunity and manipulation of group identity among conditions requiring assessment (United Nations, 2014). Conflict can initiate the cycle and can also emerge after deterioration elsewhere. Warfare destroys electricity, water, transport, communications, housing, hospitals, schools and productive facilities, displaces labour and households, reduces investment and tax collection, and increases security and humanitarian expenditure. The World Bank reports that high-intensity conflicts are typically followed by cumulative GDP-per-capita losses of about 20 per cent after five years relative to pre-conflict projections (World Bank, 2025).


Artificial intelligence affects the same capacity accounts through productivity, employment, market concentration, finance, infrastructure, information integrity and government administration. OECD data show rapid adoption and substantial concentration of venture capital in AI, while the ILO estimates that one in four workers worldwide is employed in an occupation with some exposure to generative AI (OECD, 2026b; OECD, 2026c; Gmyrek et al., 2025). The IEA projects global data-centre electricity consumption to rise from about 485 TWh in 2025 to around 950 TWh in 2030 (IEA, 2026). IMF scenario work examines labour displacement, concentration, fiscal pressure and financial instability where diffusion moves faster than institutions and infrastructure can adjust (Barhoumi et al., 2026). Current research has not established AI consciousness or self-awareness. Assessment can still examine autonomy, delegated authority, system access, auditability and human override.


Quantum computing adds a security dependency because banking, digital identity, confidential communications, government systems and commercial data rely heavily on public-key cryptography. NIST has standardised post-quantum methods and advises organisations to begin migration, including inventories of quantum-vulnerable cryptography and replacement plans across hardware, software and services (NIST, 2026).


The residual condition can be assessed through productive, household, fiscal and institutional capacity, with infrastructure and security running through each account. Productive capacity includes viable firms, working capital, equipment, skills and independently usable suppliers. Household capacity includes income, savings, housing, health, education and mobility. Fiscal capacity includes revenue, borrowing room and administrative delivery. Institutional capacity includes lawful authority, reliable information, professional competence, enforcement and coordination. Aggregate output can recover while material losses remain in one or more of these areas.


Locationalisation provides a method for allocating capability. Assessment begins with the place in which an activity or essential service must operate and records the energy, water, communications, payments, transport, labour, data, maintenance and authority required there. Functions with short restoration periods may require hyper-local provision. National systems can provide infrastructure, finance, standards and authority; regional arrangements can provide scale and additional substitutes; bilateral and plurilateral arrangements can secure specialist resources and access; and diversified international markets can maintain demand, technology, foreign exchange and commercial viability. OECD modelling indicates that broad relocalisation could materially reduce global trade and output without consistently improving resilience (OECD, 2025).


The Socioeconomic Disintegration Cycle remains a proposed analytical framework requiring empirical testing. Comparative cases can examine similar disruptions while recording common dependencies, substitute activation, firm entry and exit, employment, household income and savings, food and health outcomes, crime and unrest, fiscal capacity, infrastructure condition, institutional performance and recovery during later events. Evidence that persistent losses in these capacities are associated with weaker absorption or slower recovery during subsequent disruption would support the model. Cases in which operating capacity is restored without material residual loss would weaken or reject its application.


Mark Nuttall

Senior Board Advisor  


References

Barhoumi, K., de Carvalho, F.A., Gorbanyov, M., Kido, Y., Koll, D., Ostojic, D., Shang, B., Tamirisa, N.T., Toms, S., Dabla-Norris, E., Nguyen, A.D.M. and Zhao, Y. (2026), ‘Global Economic and Financial Implications of Artificial Intelligence: Lessons from a Scenario-Planning Exercise’, IMF Notes, 2026(002). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. doi:10.5089/9798229042482.068.

Besley, T., Dann, C. and Dray, S. (2026), ‘Growth Experiences and Trust in Government’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 141(2), pp. 1761–1822. doi:10.1093/qje/qjaf056.

FAO, WFP and Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) (2026), 2026 Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions. Rome: FAO and WFP. doi:10.4060/cd9424en.

Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005), ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’, Review of International Political Economy, 12(1), pp. 78–104. doi:10.1080/09692290500049805.

Gmyrek, P., Berg, J., Kamiński, K., Konopczyński, F., Ładna, A., Nafradi, B., Rosłaniec, K. and Troszyński, M. (2025), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure, ILO Working Paper 140. Geneva: International Labour Organization. doi:10.54394/HETP0387.

International Energy Agency (IEA) (2026), Key Questions on Energy and AI. Paris: IEA, 16 April 2026.

Martin, R. (2012), ‘Regional Economic Resilience, Hysteresis and Recessionary Shocks’, Journal of Economic Geography, 12(1), pp. 1–32. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbr019.

Martin, R. and Sunley, P. (2015), ‘On the Notion of Regional Economic Resilience: Conceptualization and Explanation’, Journal of Economic Geography, 15(1), pp. 1–42. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbu015.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (2026), Post-Quantum Cryptography. Gaithersburg, MD: NIST. Updated 2026. Available at: https://www.nist.gov/pqc (Accessed: 3 September 2026).

Nuttall, M. (2021), ‘Bribery, Corruption, Geopolitics and Investigation’, in Swain, A., Öjendal, J. and Jägerskog, A. (eds), Handbook of Security and the Environment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 290–306. doi:10.4337/9781789900668.00029.

Nuttall, M. (2022a), ‘Threats to Globalisation’, The Company Lawyer, Issue 1, pp. 18–21.

Nuttall, M. (2022b), Supply Chains and the Multiverse of Risk. Thomson Reuters.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2025), OECD Supply Chain Resilience Review: Navigating Risks. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/94e3a8ea-en.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2026a), Trends in Global Value Chains. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/8217c2ff-en.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2026b), ‘AI Use by Individuals Surges across the OECD as Adoption by Firms Continues to Expand’, 28 January 2026.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2026c), Venture Capital Investments in Artificial Intelligence through 2025, OECD Policy Briefs, No. 50. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/a13752f5-en.

Popova, O., Nikolova, M., See, S.G. and Otrachshenko, V. (2026), ‘Inflation, Unemployment, and Institutional Trust: The Global Evidence’, Oxford Economic Papers, 78(1), pp. 157–178. doi:10.1093/oep/gpaf026.

United Nations (2014), Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention. New York: United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2023), Global Study on Homicide 2023. Vienna: UNODC. ISBN 978-92-1-358738-6.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2025), The Pernicious Impact of Organized Crime on the Economy and Development. Vienna: UNODC.

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2026), Short-Term Energy Outlook: Global Oil Markets. Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration, updated 11 August 2026.

Williamson, O.E. (1981), ‘The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach’, American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), pp. 548–577. doi:10.1086/227496.

World Bank (2025), Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations: Intertwined Crises, Multiple Vulnerabilities. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Health Organization (WHO) (2026), Greater Horn of Africa Food Insecurity and Health Crisis, Situation Report No. 1 (April–June 2026). Geneva: WHO, 7 July 2026.

About Author

Mark Nuttall is an international strategic adviser, speaker and former law-enforcement intelligence leader whose work spans investment readiness, corporate validation, geopolitical and socioeconomic risk, financial crime, security and cross-border growth. 


As Principal of MB Ventures, he advises boards, founders, investors, government-linked entities and institutional stakeholders across MENA, APAC, Europe and Africa. His work supports governance, market entry, enhanced due diligence, stakeholder strategy and the preparation of complex opportunities for credible institutional engagement. He has supported strategic dialogues and capital mandate introductions exceeding USD 1 billion. 


Mark’s career includes service as a Regional Director at Thomson Reuters, Country Manager for Hill & Associates in Singapore, Criminal Intelligence Officer at INTERPOL, senior consultant to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and detective within the Metropolitan Police Service at New Scotland Yard. 


In the UAE, he serves as Independent Senior Strategic Adviser to the Board and CEO of Successo Ventures, a DFSA-regulated DIFC firm, and has led financial and economic intelligence capability-building for the UAE Ministry of Interior through Rabdan Academy. 


Mark is an ACAMS certification and assessment contributor, Fellow of the International Compliance Association, Chairperson of the International Security Leaders’ Summit at Intersec, published author and experienced international keynote speaker. 

Publication Note

This article forms part of the ITT Nexus Invited Expert Perspectives Series, developed and published by ITT Nexus and AcceleratEMEA as part of their official media partnership with AIM Congress 2026.

The views and interpretations expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of ITT Nexus, AcceleratEMEA, or AIM Congress. The author remains responsible for the accuracy of the information, data, references, and conclusions presented. Publication within this series does not constitute institutional endorsement.

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